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The well-known empiricist apories of the lawfulness of nature prevent 
an adequate philosophical interpretation of empirical science until this day. 
Clarification can only be expected through an immanent refutation of the em-
piricist point of view. My argument is that Hume’s claim, paradigmatic for 
modern empiricism, is not just inconsequent, but simply contradictory: Empi-
ricism denies that a lawlike character of nature can be substantiated. But, as is 
shown, anyone who claimes experience to be the basis of knowledge (as the 
empiricist naturally does), has, in fact, always already presupposed the law-
fullness of nature, i.e. has assumed the ontology of a nature lawful in itself. If 
lawfulness is, more closely, understood as dependency on conditions, then the 
functional character of the laws of nature is involved with the consequence 
that verification is not to be taken as a mere repetition of measurements but as 
clarification of the conditional structure of the physical process. Furthermore 
the functionality of the laws of nature also includes a statement on their inva-
riance (relative to certain transformations) and so their lawlikeness. This 
throws a new light on the problem of induction. Seen in this way it is hardly 
surprising that the notorious neglect of the functional aspect in empiricism 






For analytical philosophy of science, empiricist argumenta-
tion in the form developed in modern times, especially by Hume, 
has remained binding until today.1  While Hume's conception are 
of a general epistemological nature, in modern empiricism scien-
tific-theoretical and methodological aspects have been added or 
even come to the fore. Nevertheless, Hume's central approaches, 
especially to the concept of causality and the principle of inducti-
on, and unfortunately also the difficulties involved with them, 
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have remained decisive for neo-empiricism.2 Envisageing here a 
refutation of the empiricist argumentation, especially of its Hu-
meian core, the hope is connected with it that in this way notori-
ous problem complexes of empiricist provenance will be got rid 
of. 
In order to avoid misunderstandings, let me first point out 
that empiricism and empirical science are trivially not the same 
thing. Empiricism is a philosophical position whose criticism 
must not be misunderstood as a devaluation of empirical science. 
On the contrary such criticism is determined by the conviction 
that an empiricist theory of science, contrary to its actual intenti-
on, is not able to provide a philosophically satisfying interpreta-
tion of empirical scientific knowledge. So, as will be shown, em-
piricism is to be criticized also and especially for the sake of em-
pirical science. 
But hasn't that already happened? One can here – in order to 
historically mark two extremes – think of Kant's transcendental 
turn against Hume or, in the present, of R. Harré and E.H. Mad-
den's recently developed anti-empiricist view.3 However, the 
Hume-critics carried out in the present context goes beyond the 
usual objections, if I see rightly, in that it aims at an inconsisten-
cy prove and thus not only at negating the empiricist position, but 




Since causal connections per se are neither sensually per-
ceptible nor logically provable,4 they can, so the well-known ar-
gument of Hume, only be based on psychical habituation to empi-
rical regularities.5 The phenomenon of habit-forming that is clai-
med here can, of course, by being based exclusively on past expe-
rience, offer no guarantee of future experience. The inductive 
conclusion from the past to the future is therefore, according to 
Hume, logically unjustifiable, even though we are constantly 
drawing it in practice and in science.6 It would be conceivable 
that snow will taste like salt in the future, or that the trees will 
flower in winter instead of spring.7  
If these considerations were correct, the possibility of empi-
rical science would be called into question: Causality would me-
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rely be our subjective interpretation, induction a completely un-
secured conclusion from the observed to the unobserved.8  
Kant, on the other hand, develops a transcendental-
philosophical approach to justify the bindingness of empirical 
knowledge. He carries out a reversal of perspective, according to 
which subjective conditions of experience are nevertheless of ob-
jective relevance, in that the object is supposed to be essentially 
co-constituted by the subject. Admittedly, Kant's transcendental 
turn thus initially only has the character of a counter-concept to 
Hume's position, which thus, however, is by no means refuted. 
Kant claims the scientific character of the causal category, Hume 
denies it. Kant believes that he can refer to the objectivity of na-
tural science as a fact9 that Hume doubts, at least epistemologi-
cally, in short: As long as no real refutation of the empirical ap-
proach has been made, opinion stands against opinion, and the 
decision for one or the opposite seems to be rather a question of 
philosophical taste or world view.  
The analogical is true for the Hume criticism recently put 
forward by R. Harré and E. H. Madden.10 Hume's assumption of 
isolated perceptual events is countered here by a thing ontology, 
according to which things have a dynamic disposition ("nature") 
by virtue of which they interact in a specific way – certainly a 
thought worthy of consideration, of which, of course, it cannot be 
claimed that the authors have given a satisfactory explanation. 
The introductory formulated thesis, that "there can be no doubt 
that the Humeian conception of causality ... must be wrong"11 ba-
sically remains merely reassuring.  
In contrast to this, in the following evidence shall be provi-
ded that Hume's argumentation is contradictory and therefore 
lapses into self-cancelling – since Socrates still the strongest 
form of refutation, which alone achieves the real destruction of a 
conception, while one may or may not agree to a mere alternative 
position. Subsequently, it will be examined what consequences 
result from the destruction of the empiricist conception in ontolo-
gical and in scientific-theoretical and methodological terms. 
 
II 
In the sense of the intended criticism, it should first be poin-
ted out that there is a certain ambiguity in Hume: Hume's doubts 
– in W. Stegmüller's formulation – on the justification of "truth-
conserving conclusions", concluding from what is observed to 
what is unobserved,12 seems to be of undeniable plausibility up to 
this day. Stegmüller calls this the "Hume challenge".13 However, 
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this plausibility suffers from the fact that Hume does not distin-
guish between natural processes and natural laws. Hume's argu-
ment that the course of nature could change14 naturally means a 
change of the laws of nature,15 because changes due to processua-
lity trivially permanently take place, even if the laws of nature are 
preserved unchanged: In the course of a movement, the place 
and, in general, also the state of movement of a body changes; in-
teraction processes can result in manifold changes of state, e.g. of 
the shape of a thing, the color, the force field, etc. In Hume's 
work, there are repeatedly formulations which are clearly to be 
understood in this sense, but sometimes the other way round, for 
example, when the occurrence of unexpected events is attributed 
to altered effects of forces, for instance "hidden" forces or the 
"secret effectiveness of conflicting causes".16 But, to be sure, 
such explanations assume an objective lawfulness in the matter it-
self, which would be incompatible with Hume's subjectivist cau-
sal interpretation – a discrepancy that is, however, repairable, 
since the formulations mentioned can be abandoned without harm 
to Hume's actual line of argumentation.  
Irreparable, on the other hand, is an argumentation that is 
not only discrepant, but logically contradictory. Such contradic-
tions seem to be contained in Hume's view; there are four points I 
would like to emphasize in this respect: 
(1) Hume interprets the causal connection as a habit-
forming process brought forth by observed regularities. But that 
means that he assumes the habit-forming is caused, which cause 
in turn cannot be traced back to habit-forming, since it rather is 
to be underlying that. Hume's formulations initially conceal this; 
instead of causality, for example, he asserts that an observed re-
gularity "leads to"17 that a habit is "formed" and that this habit 
then "creates"18 an expectation for the future. But this cannot be-
lie the fact that Hume already presupposes for his criticism what 
he criticizes – namely a kind of real causality, albeit here for in-
ner-psychic processes – and thus becomes logically contradictory 
on this point.19  
(2) Another inconsistency is concealed in Hume's sceptical 
standard argument that a change in the seemingly unchanging 
laws of nature remains conceivable,20 whereby the old idea of an 
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all-devouring time, which nothing can withstand, is obviously in 
the background. Now, anyone who assumes that the future can be 
totally different from the past has in any case also assumed that a 
distinction can be made between past and future and that memory 
is intact, i.e. that the past can be retained as past. Only in this 
way can the concept of time be used meaningfully. Anyone who 
argues that nothing can stand up to time has always assumed that 
the concept of time is meaningful and has thus implicitly assumed 
that there is something that can stand up to time, namely such as 
memory. The thesis that nothing stands up to time must, in order 
to be meaningful at all, exclude memory and is therefore not te-
nable in its general form. The weakening of the thesis that there 
is possibly nothing that stands up to time is of no use in this re-
spect; for this formulation, too, must already contain 'time' as a 
meaningful concept and therefore presuppose a time-bridging 
memory in any case.  
(3) What has first been stated here for the memory of the 
subject can also be transferred into objective conditions: So, in 
order to objectify the concept of time, we use clocks, which must 
function reliably in the sense of a binding concept of time. The 
least that could be demanded in the present context is that they 
correctly indicate the difference between past and future. The 
concept of an all-devouring time therefore includes in any case 
the assumption of an invariant direction of the clocks – whatever 
that may mean. Such an opinion must therefore presuppose what 
it denies – that there is something that can stand up to time – and 
thus likewise proves to be contradictory.  
(4) Finally, in a very fundamental sense the question arises: 
Is it even sensefully conceivable at all that things do not behave 
invariably-lawlike, but change at random over time? Now, that 
this would lead to absurd consequences for the everyday handling 
of things – our entire world orientation is based on the lawful be-
haviour of things – cannot be regarded as an argument in this 
context. However, in the sense of an immanent criticism of empi-
ricism in any case one will be allowed to assume that empiricism 
as such at least grants the possibility of experience. Here an old 
argument of Popper's becomes important: Even the simple obser-
vation: 'There stands a glass of water' contains general terms 
'glass', 'water', which as such imply a lawfully-invariant behavi-
our:21 How else could I be sure that it is really glass and not pla-
stic, water and not petrol or even hallucinations? We can only 
speak of 'glass' and 'water' if the substances correspond to the be-
havioral laws of glass and water. As the fulfilment of defining 
conditions and condition dependencies must be checked by mea-
suring technology, the argumentation can even be extended to the 
point that empirical science necessarily remains dependent on ap-
paratus that works reliably and that means: lawfully. It would not 
make much sense to carry out spectroscopic measurements with a 
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dubious spectroscope – the data obtained can only be relevant if 
the measuring instrument works reliably.22  
In short: Insofar as empiricism obviously always already 
presupposes the possibility of experience empiricism has always 
already presupposed a lawfully-invariant behaviour of things and 
measuring devices, which it as empiricism in turn essentially 
questions. Such an argumentation is vitiously circular, i.e. logi-
cally contradictory and thus not a philosophically tenable positi-
on. Even those who admit already most primitive forms of expe-
rience of nature (like the empiricist) thereby have always already 
assumed the laws of nature, which must be regarded as an inesca-
pable prerequisite of all empirical recognition and therefore can-
not be consistently disputed by empiricism.23  
 
III 
With the general assumption of a lawful nature at all, of 
course, knowledge of the specific laws of nature in each case is 
not already claimed. The explanation of these laws is a matter of 
empirical research, whereby in the sense of the general natural 
lawfulness to be assumed necessarily, it is to be supposed that 
with the possibility of empirical error also the possibility of error 
correction exists, in other words: As little knowledge of expe-
rience can claim absolute character due to its finiteness, so much 
is certain that the occurrence of unexpected deviations in the be-
haviour of an object basicly cannot be interpreted as a miracle. If 
the object does not show the expected behaviour, this is rather to 
be seen as a compelling hint to still hidden dependencies, which 
can be tracked down by systematic variation of the experimential 
conditions: This is guaranteed by that general natural lawfulness, 
the assumption of which, as explained, becomes inevitable as 
soon as experience is accepted as source of knowledge. Since this 
is self-evident for every empirical science, it cannot avoid the as-
sumption of a nature that is lawful in itself.  
From this point of view, light falls on the problem of the 
empirical basis of natural science, too: According to Popper's 
well known opinion, a lawfulness statement of the kind 'all swans 
are white' cannot be verified (since all swans of the past, present 
and future cannot be verified in principle), but it can be falsified, 
namely by a basic sentence of the kind 'there is a black swan'. 
Admittedly I must be sure that the facts formulated in a basic sen-
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tence really exist and are not just hallucinated or, methodologi-
cally speaking, that it is a reproducible effect.24 But 'reproducible' 
can only be a lawlike phenomenon. Thus the basic sentence al-
ready implies lawfulness which, as Popper admits, must itself be 
"corroborated".25 'Corroboration', however, is nothing else but a 
preliminary verification (which tries to avoid the verification 
problem in the indicated form by this weakening). This makes 
clear that even for the falsification of a lawfulness statement one 
has to refer back to an already verified lawfulness statement, or in 
other words: Without positively secured data, not even the nega-
tive business of falsification is possible. Falsification requires ve-
rification; claiming the possibility of falsification and denying the 
possibility of verification is contradictory.  
Popper notices the problem, but reacts to it in a basically 
conventionalist way: Basic sentences should ultimately only ap-
ply by fixing them and be recognized as such by the scientific 
community26 – whereby already Kuhn-Feyerabendian premoniti-
ons are conjured up. Popper's dissociation from conventionalism 
has in this context rather verbal character: The here made subsi-
diary argument that by such determinations is disposed only of 
singular, not of universal propositions27 falls behind Popper's 
own insight, already apostrophized in the previous chapter (see 
II), that also singular propositions contain universals, which as 
such imply a lawful behaviour and thus universal lawfulness sta-
tements. But exactly this is the reason for the fact that, as explai-
ned, falsification already presupposes verification or, ontological-
ly turned, the assumption of an inherently lawful nature is indeed 
inevitable as soon as only the possibility of the most primitive 
forms of experience-knowledge is asserted. 
 
IV 
That the condition of a lawful nature belongs constitutively 
to the possibility of empirical knowledge can be understood more 
concretely in the sense that only in this way there is the possibili-
ty to prevent or correct the immediate sensory illusion which has 
repeatedly discredited experience philosophically. The perception 
of the rod broken in water is corrected and explained by the law 
of refraction and thus, instead of being a mere subjective sensory 
illusion, it can now also be understood as an objective natural 
phenomenon. Indeed, experience can only have cognitive charac-
ter on the basis of a previously established natural law, without 
which it would not at all be binding.  
This may sound well Kantian, but it should be noted that it 
has been developed here completely independent of a theory of 
transcendental object constitution à la Kant. Basically, less than 
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is claimed by Kant – not the categorical formula: 'Nature is law-
ful', but only the hypothetical one: 'He who considers experience 
knowledge possible has thereby also taken over the ontology of a 
nature that is lawful by itself'. Whether on the other hand expe-
riential knowledge is possible in any form, however, remains un-
decided here. 
However, one might ask whether the possibility of empirical 
knowledge can ultimately be denied at all: For every denial im-
plies communication and communication partner with physical 
organization, whose normal, and that means again: lawful functi-
on must be presupposed for this. Seen in this light, it would in-
deed be inconsistent to want to deny the knowledge of experience 
and natural law, since such denial already presupposes the very 
thing it denies. Even those who attempt to doubt in linguistic 
form the regularity of nature or the possibility of experience will 
be lying to themselves, inasmuch as they already claim that what 
they doubt for their linguistic accomplishments and even for their 
acts of thought, which also have a natural side. From this point of 
view, there is a lot to be said for accepting the assumption of an 
inherently lawful nature in a categorical sense. The impossibility 
of consistently denying such an assumption thus refers – which 
would have to be clarified in more detail in a separate investiga-
tion – to an inescapable ontological structure and thus the basic 
constitution of nature itself.28  
 
V 
But can such a general principle as the lawfulness of nature 
have concrete consequences at all? First of all, it is necessary to 
remember what was said in section II, according to which unex-
pected deviations in an object process cannot be interpreted as 
miracle and therefore motivate the search for hidden conditions 
of such anomalies. The principle of the lawfulness of nature thus 
has an initial and at least pragmatic function for the process of 
scientific research. At the same time, it suggests a view that law-
fulness is to be understood more closely as the dependence of a 
process on 'conditions'. At this point, a systematic explanation 
must be dispensed with.29 Instead, reference is made to the factual 
procedure of natural science, which aims at the formulation of 
(quantitative) functional laws. Why? Obviously because with the 
help of the mathematical concept of function conditional depen-
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dencies can be represented. The functional relationship of the law 
of gravity, for example, shows directly that and how the force of 
attraction depends on the distance of the gravitating masses. The 
functionality of a physical system reveals its specific condition 
structure and thus the underlying lawfulness, which only becomes 
concretely graspable in the functional condition dependence.  
Now this has direct consequences for the verification pro-
blem. If lawfulness is understood essentially as condition depen-
dence, then the sense of verification of lawfulness statements is 
also affected:  
Of course, to want to ensure the validity of a law of nature 
for all places and times through empirical testing is a hopeless 
undertaking. If this were the purpose of verification, as empiri-
cism suggests, verification would indeed be impossible. The 
space-time-spanning generality of lawlike statements then inevi-
tably involves, in view of the finiteness of all experience, the in-
duction problem – a scandalon of empiricism,30 which repeatedly 
presents its efforts to provide a rational reconstruction of empiri-
cal science as doomed to failure.  
The conditional character of the lawfulness of nature, on 
the other hand, suggests a more essential sense of verification, 
which is, in general, in accordance with the concrete practice of 
scientific research. If lawfulness is understood as condition de-
pendence, then verification would accordingly be understood as a 
check of assumed dependency relationships, e.g. the distance de-
pendence in the law of gravity by systematically varying the di-
stances of gravitating masses and determining the respective gra-
vitational force.  
One might object that even the examination of dependency 
relationships can never be complete. This seems to be important 
in so far as many points of a curve do not uniquely define the cor-
responding function, i.e. with many measurements the functiona-
lity of a system remains strictly speaking indeterminate, so that in 
this respect there seems to be an analogy to the induction pro-
blem: Instead of the time aspect there is a structural aspect. An 
important difference, however, is that structural uncertainties can 
be arbitrarily limited with corresponding effort by more densely 
laying the measurements.  
It may be further objected that for relevant measurements, 
as already explained above,31 the proper functioning of the mea-
suring instruments used must always be demanded: Must not 
their condition structures already be completely known? – which 
of course can only be the case approximately, too. But this does 
not result in a fundamental problem, but only in a technical one: 
Dubious measurement results can be checked with similar measu-
ring instruments and the functioning of the instruments themsel-
ves can be tested with the help of other devices, etc. The closer 
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C.D. Board is described as "the ignominy of philosophy". 
31 Section II. 
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the network of such tests is woven, the more reliably the condi-
tional connection of a natural phenomenon becomes comprehen-
sible and controllable, in short: All empirical procedures remain, 
to speak with Popper, in principle the object of criticism, but the 
criticizability can be reduced more and more and the certainty of 
empirical knowledge can be increased almost arbitrarily. Top 
technical achievements bear eloquent witness to this.  
It should be noted that the possibility of initially hidden 
conditions does not constitute a fundamental objection either. 
Certainly: It is possible that a parameter that is constant here and 
now will only become visible when changing location or at a later 
time. It could be that a certain effect depends, for example, on the 
latitude or the phase of the moon. But that is naturally verifiable. 
That is why experiments are repeated at different places and at 
different times: they must be reproducible identically; if they are 
not, the conclusion of hidden dependencies is obvious.  
Altogether: If the lawful character of nature is generally 
presupposed – and just this presupposition cannot, as has been 
shown, be consistently disputed – and if the laws of nature are 
more concretely conceived as dependence on conditions, verifica-
tion no longer has the absurd sense of continued measurements of 
the same issue, but amounts to the examination of objective de-
pendencies on conditions.32 Only in this way is the immanent 
structure and functionality of the object itself taken into account. 
The difficulties that can occur here are of technical, not funda-
mental nature. They do not question the general lawfulness cha-
racter of natural being, but rather confirm it: For ignorance of 
conditions is not the same as absence of conditions and thus of 
natural lawfulness, i.e. also 'hidden' conditions are in any case 
conditions of lawful behavior. Moreover, the explication of law-
fulness as condition dependence finds practical verification in the 
fact that just in the most highly developed natural sciences func-
tional laws are of central importance.33  
 
VI 
All the more surprising is the fact that the functional cha-
racter of laws of nature has received practically no attention in 
analytical philosophy of science, at least not with regard to possi-
ble philosophical implications.34 Instead, the problem of natural 
laws is tirelessly discussed using the example of qualitative sta-
                                                     
32 See also D. Wandschneider, Formale Sprache und Erfahrung, Stuttgart 
1975, ch. M 6. 
33 The predominance of the concept of function over the concept of substance 
was rightly established by E. Cassirer ('Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff', 
Darmstadt 31969) as a characteristic of modern science. 
34 One example for many is the voluminous work of E. Nagel, The Structure 
of Science, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta 1961, which provides 
a broad discussion of the scientific concept of law, but only states the func-
tional character of natural laws without philosophically problematizing it (e.g. 
77 f.). 
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tements of the kind: 'All swans are white', 'All metals are conduc-
tive', etc. It is not astonishing that verification could only be un-
derstood as an infinite sequence of cases of realization. Since the 
conditional character of natural laws thus remained concealed, 
there was also no formation of a concept of verification in the 
sense outlined above.35 To what extent also the notorious inducti-
on problem, i.e. the problem of justification of invariance of na-
tural laws spanning space and time, is to be understood as a con-
sequence of the scientific-theoretical neglect of the functional 
character of natural laws, is to be finally only hinted at.  
Let us again take the law of gravity as an example: The 
force with which two given masses attract each other is known to 
depend solely on their distance. However, what only depends on 
the distance is independent of where such a dependence takes 
place, since the determination of distance as a pure difference 
quantity does not depend on the region of the world, but has inva-
riant meaning,36 in other words:  The distance dependence of the 
law of gravity contains always also the statement that it is inva-
riant to displacements in space. The same applies to function 
laws that depend on time differences.37  
This simple formal mathematical relationship reveals a 
principle-theoretical highly significant connection: Functionality 
and invariance are obviously not independent views. Rather, the 
functionality of the lawfulness of nature already latently contains 
a statement regarding its invariance. This may be surprising at 
first, but is explained by the fact that the description of the func-
tion of a thing, as explained, reveals its condition structure. The 
conditioned, however, together with its conditions: this both to-
gether is then no longer a conditioned, but in sum an invariant 
un-conditioned in itself. This, it seems to me, is the actual reason 
for the constitutive connection between functionality and invari-
ance in the concept of natural law. 
Popper's argument, which has been repeatedly referred to 
here, that the identification of a thing with respect to its functio-
nality always implies a lawful behaviour, finds its justification at 
all only in the shown connection of functionality and invarian-
ce.38 The statement of a functional connection justifies at the sa-
me time what scientific practice, following its instinct of reason, 
has always assumed: the invariance of natural laws, and that 
                                                     
35 This neglect of the conditional character has, by the way, also hindered the 
development of an appropriate concept of natural possibility, which makes 
understandable the considerable difficulties of the theory of science with the 
concept of disposition; see Wandschneider, Mögl. von Wiss., op. cit. 
36 In the general theory of relativity a more general determination of distance 
is defined, which in turn has an invariant character as distance determination; 
see e.g. F. Hund, Grundbegriffe der Physik, Mannheim 1969, 109. 
37 See op. cit. 71. 
38 This also applies to the initially mentioned conception of Harré and Mad-
den, also based on Popper's argument, according to which things have a speci-
fic 'nature' that determines their characteristic behavior. 
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means, too: an lawfulness knowledge exeeding the empirical si-
tuation. The empiricist problem of induction thus ultimately pro-
ves to be a conundrum, an illusory problem due to a deficient 
concept of the law of nature that misappropriates the functional 
character of objects: Anyone who knows the functionality of a 
thing has identified it, and that means that he has recognized it in 
terms of its invariant behaviour. Whoever does not know the 
functionality of a thing, on the other hand, does not know the 
thing and can therefore not be sure of its behavior in any way. 
The character of invariance is constitutively bound to the charac-
ter of function, in so far as this character represents the conditi-
ons of a thing, and it is therefore not surprising that the neglect of 
the functional aspect in the context of empiricist philosophy of 
science has led to fundamental difficulties concerning the concept 
of natural law. 
 
